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NOTES AND COMMENTS
HEALTH CARE & RETIREMENT CORP. OF
AMERICA: A POTENTIAL BROADENING
OF THE TEST FOR SUPERVISORY
STATUS UNDER THE NLRA
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's May 1994 decision in NLRB v. Health Care
and Retirement Corp. of America' was a major victory for health care
employers, and conversely a huge setback for health care labor unions
and employees. The Supreme Court held the National Labor Rela-
tions Board's (NLRB) test for determining whether nurses are super-
visors within the meaning of section 2(11) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) was invalid.2 This decision reversed a 20-year-
old NLRB policy that a nurse was not a supervisor if the "supervisory
conduct of the ... nurse [was] the exercise of professional judgment
incidental to patient care" and therefore not "supervisory authority in
the interest of the employer."3
The Supreme Court determined the NLRB's test for supervisory
status of nurses was inconsistent with the NLRA and the Court's
precedents.4 In so ruling, the Court held against the majority of cir-
cuit courts which had previously held nurses were not supervisors
when their discretion was exercised in accordance with professional
judgment as to the best interest of the patient rather than a manage-
rial decision in the employer's best interest.5 The Court took a very
narrow view of the definition of a "supervisor" and looked only to its
prior precedents construing one phrase of section 2(11): "in the inter-
est of the employer." It refused to consider the policy and rationale
1. 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994).
2. Id. at 1785.
3. See Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B. 491, 493 (1993).
4. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1785.
5. See discussion infra section 111(B).
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behind the NLRB's test and, in effect, broadened the test for supervi-
sory status of nurses under section 2(11). In consequence, the test for
"professional employee" found in section 2(12) of the NLRA may be
similarly broadened in the future. The decision is contrary to the leg-
islative history of section 2(11)6 and the 1974 Amendment to the
NLRA including nonprofit hospitals under the NLRA. Conse-
quently, this note will contend the Supreme Court should reconsider
its decision on this extremely important issue.
I1. HISTORY OF THE NLRA AS APPLIED TO SUPERVISORS
What is generally known as the National Labor Relations Act is
in fact three separate statutes enacted by Congress in 1935, 1947, and
1959.7 The NLRA, popularly known as the Wagner Act, was enacted
in 19358 and ended the debate which had raged for more than a cen-
tury over employees' rights to join unions and to participate in collec-
tive bargaining. 9 Under the Wagner Act, any worker fitting the
definition of "employee" was covered under the NLRA and supervi-
sors were not expressly excluded by this definition. 10 Supervisors
were thus free to join unions of their choosing and participate in col-
lective bargaining.1 Employers complained that allowing supervisors
these rights created an imbalance of power between management and
6. See infra note 31.
7. FRANK W. McCuLLOCH & TIM BORNSTEIN, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 16 (1974). The 1959 amendment to the National Labor Relations Act, the Labor Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, popularly known as the Landrum-Griffin Act,
did not affect the definition or exclusion of supervisors in any way. See Stuart H. Bompey &
Carolyn S. Schwartz, When Confidential Employees Are Not Considered "Confidential" - A Re-
view of the Supreme Court's Decision in NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership
Corp., 13 SETON HALL L. REv. 490, 492 (1983). The most significant change made by the Lan-
drum-Griffin Act was to provide additional protection for union members against acts that have
the potential to disregard their rights such as corruption by union leaders. Id.
8. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)). The popular name for the Act came from its main
sponsor in the Senate, Senator Robert Wagner. McCuLLocH, supra note 7, at 17.
9. McCui.LocH, supra note 7, at 3.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988). The original definition of employee stated:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the em-
ployees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall
include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection
with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not
obtained any other regular or substantially equivalent employment, but shall not in-
clude any individual employed.., by his parent or spouse.
National Labor Relations Act § 2(3).
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
[Vol. 31:323
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labor.'2 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court refused to make an excep-
tion for supervisors and exclude them from coverage when the NLRA
did not specifically do so.' 3 The Court maintained it was "for Con-
gress, not for us, to create exceptions or qualifications at odds with the
plain terms" of the NLRA.'4 Accordingly, in Packard Motor Car Co.
v. NLRB, the Supreme Court held foremen could organize as a unit of
a labor union." The next year, Congress did exclude supervisors from
the NLRA's coverage when it amended the definition of "em-
ployee"' 6 and added section 14(a)' 7 in enacting the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947, popularly known as the Taft-Hartley
Act.'" The statute's definition of employee now states that an "'em-
ployee' ... shall not include.., any individual employed as a supervi-
sor."' 9 Section 14(a) exempts employers from the duty to
acknowledge supervisors as employees for the purpose of laws that
relate to collective bargaining.2 0 A supervisor is defined in section
2(11) of the NLRA as:
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, re-
ward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them,
or adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action,
if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is
not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment.2'
12. NLRB v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778, 1780 (1994).
13. Id.
14. Id. (quoting Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 490 (1947)).
15. 330 U.S. at 490-92. The foremen, who were responsible for ensuring the quality and
quantity of products made at the plant, wanted to join a union. Id. at 487. The Company refused
to recognize the Union. Id. at 488. The Court held the intention of Congress was not to keep
foremen from unionizing. Id.
16. See Bompey & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 493-94; see also Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136-38 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988)).
17. Section 14(a) provides that:
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming
or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject to this sub-
chapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as em-
ployees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective
bargaining.
29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1988).
18. The Developing Labor Law, The Board, The Courts, and the National Labor Relations
Act, (Patrick Harden et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992), 2 A.B.A. SEC LAB. EMPLOY. L. REP. 1608 [herein-
after Developing Labor Law].
19. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988).
20. Developing Labor Law, supra note 18, at 1608.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1988).
1995]
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III. NLRB's PATIENT CARE ANALYSIS TEST AND ITS STATUS IN
THE CIRCUIT COURTS PRIOR TO HEALTH CARE
A. The NLRB's Patient Care Analysis
In 1974, Congress extended the NLRB's jurisdiction to nonprofit
hospitals by enacting the 1974 Health Care Amendments.22 Concerns
arose at that time that all professional health care employees would
automatically be found to be supervisors by the NLRB. 3 However,
since 1974, the NLRB has used what it calls the "patient care" analysis
to determine whether a nurse is a supervisor within section 2(11) of
the Act "to ensure that they are not excluded from coverage simply
because of their professional responsibility."' 4 The NLRB has applied
this test to both registered nurses (RNs), who are deemed professional
employees under the NLRA, and to licensed practical nurses (LPNs),
who are "if not full-fledged professionals,.., at least sub profession-
als."'  The patient care analysis inspects whether nurses' supervisory
work "is the exercise of professional judgment incidental to patient
care or the exercise of supervisory authority in the interest of the
employer. 26
B. Conflict in the Circuit Courts of Appeals
1. Circuits Upholding the NLRB's Patient Care Analysis
The first circuit to examine the rationale behind the NLRB's pa-
tient care analysis was the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Doctors' Hospital
of Modesto, Inc.27 in 1973. This case was the beginning of the NLRB's
patient care analysis. The NLRB held alleged supervisory nurses
were not supervisors because their duties and authority were inciden-
tal to their professional skills and stated that without more, this au-
thority was not supervisory authority in the interest of the employer.2 8
22. National Labor Relations Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(14) (1988)); Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B. 491,492
(1993).
23. Northcrest, 313 N.L.R.B. at 492.
24. Id. at 493.
25. 1d. at 493 n.10 (quoting NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1466 (7th Cir. 1983)).
See also Centralia Convalescent Ctr., 295 N.L.R.B. 42 (1989) (discussing RNs); Waverly-Cedar
Falls Health Care, 297 N.L.R.B. 390 (1989) (discussing LPNs).
26. Northcrest, 313 N.L.R.B. at 493.
27. 489 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1973), enforcing 193 N.L.R.B. 833 (1971).
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Conversely, nurses who additionally had authority to recommend ac-
tion as to the job status and pay of other employees were supervi-
sors.2' The NLRB found other nurses were not supervisors because,
as skilled professionals, their independent judgement and direction
was used for patients in their care and not for supervisory authority on
behalf of their employer.3 0
In upholding the NLRB's findings in Doctors' Hospital, the Ninth
Circuit did not adopt the exact language of the NLRB but instead
used language from the legislative history of the definition of supervi-
sor in the NLRA.31 It analogized nurses to leadmen and straw bosses
whose authority to give minor directives or orders to others does not
make them a part of management, which would lead to supervisory
status under the NLRA.32 Accordingly, because nurses are highly
trained professionals who may use some independent judgment, this
does not always make them part of management or a supervisor.33
29. Id.
30. Id. at 951-52. The two propositions, that authority as a product of professional skills and
independent judgment and direction primarily being of patients instead of authority on behalf of
the employer does not equate supervisory authority, together state the NLRB's patient care
analysis. See Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 N.L.R.B. 491,492 (1993). The NLRB's began using
its patient care analysis in full force a year later after it was endorsed by the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare. Id. at 493.
31. Doctors' Hosp., 498 F.2d at 776. The Senate Committee Report accompanying the
amendment excluding supervisors from the NLRA states:
The committee has not been unmindful of the fact that certain employees with minor
supervisory duties have problems which may justify their inclusion [within the protec-
tions of the Act]. It has therefore distinguished between straw bosses, leadmen, set-up
men, and other minor supervisory employees, on the one hand, and the supervisor
vested with such genuine management prerogatives as the right to hire or fire, disci-
pline, or make effective recommendations with respect to such action.
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1130, 1135, and
in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONs Acr, 1947, at 425
(1948) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 105].
32. Doctors' Hosp., 489 F.2d at 776. See also Ross Potra-Plant, Inc. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d
1180, 1182 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding crew members or department heads not to be supervisors
because they did not have actual authority effectively to direct other employees); NLRB v. Se-
curity Guard Serv., 384 F.2d 143, 149 (5th Cir. 1967) (finding a security guard was at most a
leadman, unidentified with management, and therefore not a supervisor); North Virginia Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 168, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1962) (finding a 'dock chief' not to have supervi-
sory status because he exercised no discretion or independent judgment and was really a sub-
foreman or no more than a 'gangleader'); NLRB v. Swift & Co., 240 F.2d 65, 66-67 (9th Cir.
1957) (finding plant clerks' work was merely routine and thus they were not supervisors); NLRB
v. Parma Water Lifter, 211 F.2d 258,261 (9th Cir. 1954), cert denied, 348 U.S. 829, (1954) (find-
ing a latheworker who gave minor direction to other workers was merely a 'room boss' and not a
supervisor).
33. Doctors' Hosp., 489 F.2d at 776. See also NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp. of Lynwood, 601
F.2d 404, 420-21 (9th Cir. 1979), enforcing 232 N.L.R.B. 32 (1977) (upholding the NLRB's pa-
tient care analysis and agreeing with Doctors' Hospital).
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The Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals have also upheld the NLRB's application of its patient care anal-
ysis.34 However, the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly rejected the NLRB's
test3' and the Fourth Circuit has been unclear about its position.36
The Second Circuit, in reviewing an unfair labor practice claim against
a hospital, upheld the NLRB's finding that a head nurse "did not pos-
sess or exercise any of the statutory indicia of supervisory status" after
reviewing the job tasks of the nurse as compared to the NLRB's pa-
tient care analysis.37
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has approved the NLRB's
patient care analysis, while applying additional factors.38 It has stated
supervision is not within the meaning of section 2(11) if it is exercised
in conformity with professional norms instead of business norms. 3 9
However, in reaching its conclusions, this circuit generally focused on
the policies behind the supervisor exclusion by weighing the nurse's
duties in light of the balance of power and conflict of interests be-
tween employees and employers.40 This circuit emphasized two con-
siderations in this respect. First, it looked at the balance of power
issue by examining the ratio of supervisory to non-supervisory em-
ployees under the competing positions of the parties.41 Second, it
looked at the conflict of interest concern by examining the disciplinary
authority of alleged supervisors.42
34. Northcrest, 313 N.L.R.B. at 495. See generally id. (providing an excellent summary of
the NLRB's patient care analysis including its history and treatment in the courts).
35. ld. The Sixth Circuit's decisions have created a problem of venue shopping by alleged
supervisory nurses. Id. at 495-96. The venue provisions of the NLRA allow decisions of the
Board to be reviewed in circuits other than the circuit where the unfair labor practices occur. Id.
at 496. Recognizing this venue provision, the NLRB has found that the NLRA "does not con-
template that the law of a single circuit [will] exclusively apply in any given case." Arvin Indus-
tries, 285 N.L.R.B. 753, 757 (1987).
36. Northcrest, 313 N.L.R.B. at 495.
37. Misericordia Hosp. Medical Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 816 (2d Cir. 1980), enforcing
246 N.L.R.B. 351 (1979). First, the court found that the NLRB was correct in finding that in
practice and in theory the head nurse's authority was primarily focused on providing patient care
and not on supervising employees for management. Id. Second, the court found the NLRB
correctly held that although the nurse directed the employees' work in her unit, that direction
was a circumstance of her professional authority to treat patients. Id. at 817. Therefore, the
nurse was not a supervisor. Id. at 818.
38. Children's Habilitation Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir. 1989), enforcing
289 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (July 28, 1988).
39. Id.
40. 1d at 131-32.
41. Id. at 132.
42. Id. Using this refined test in its most recent case on the issue of the supervisory status
of nurses, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found head nurses not to be supervisors. Id. at
134. The ratio of supervisory to non-supervisory employees would have been seven to forty-
eight if the nurses were not classified as supervisors or twelve to forty-three if the nurses were
6
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The Eighth Circuit has upheld the patient care analysis by follow-
ing the Seventh Circuit's lead in NLRB v. Res-Care.43 The Eighth
Circuit cited to this decision and agreed that although LPNs tradition-
ally keep authority to assign nurse aides, the exercise of that authority
is within "tight constraints" and any discretion is conferred in "accord-
ance with professional judgment" in the "best interests of the patient
rather than a managerial judgment" in the interest of the employer."
This circuit also noted, in accord with Res-Care, that being the highest
ranking employee at some time during work hours does not automati-
cally make an LPN a supervisor.4' In applying these principles to
LPNs who were classified by their employer as supervisors, the Eighth
Circuit found the LPNs did not exercise independent judgment46 and
had limited disciplinary authority that was not sufficient to equate su-
pervisory status.47
The Eleventh Circuit has upheld the NLRB's patient care analy-
sis and used it as the primary criterion for determining the supervisory
status of nurses.' s The circuit focused on whether nurses are responsi-
ble for primary personnel decisions such as disciplining, hiring, firing,
counted as supervisors. I. at 132. The first ratio would make one supervisor for every six to
seven employees, a ratio the Seventh Circuit found to be appropriate for non-supervisory status
because the balance of power would not create a problem. Id. at 133. As for the second prong,
disciplinary authority, the court found the charge nurses' responsibility to discipline "not so
great as to make serious problems of divided loyalties inevitable." Id. Although the "nurses
issue[d] ... warnings to employees [for] violations of the employer's rules, and the warnings
[were] put in the employees' files, [they] had no responsibility for recommending discipline" and
decisions to discipline were made by conceded supervisors of the center. Id.
43. 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1983). See Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB,
933 F.2d 626, 630 (8th Cir. 1991), enforcing 297 N.L.R.B. 390 (1989).
44. Waverly, 933 F.2d at 630 (quoting Res-Care, 705 F.2d at 1468).
45. Id. The hospital in Waverly argued if the LPNs were not supervisors, the hospital was
not supervised during many of its hours of operation. Id. The Court rejected this argument and
instead found that while in charge the LPNs followed routine procedures and were therefore not
supervisors. Id.
46. Although the LPNs could call in replacements in cases of emergency, the court found
the LPNs were only carrying out the policies of management based on the hospitals longstanding
procedure of using a call-in list. Id. If an LPN could not find replacements the director of
nursing or the assistant director of nursing was called to handle the matter. Id.
47. Id. The LPNs had authority to issue written and oral warnings; however, warnings
alone did not affect job status and the DON handled all disciplinary action. Id. In addition, the
court noted a previous holding of the NLRB that "for the issuance of reprimands or warnings to
constitute statutory supervisory authority, the warning must not only initiate, or be considered in
determining future disciplinary action, but also it must be the basis of later personnel action
without independent investigation or review by other supervisors." Id. (quoting Passavant
Health Ctr., 284 N.L.R.B. 887 (1987)). The court also looked at the ratio of supervisors to em-
ployees, as the Seventh Circuit does, but found the ratios to be unreasonable and therefore did
not use this criterion for determining supervisory status in this case. Id.
48. See NLRB v. Walker County Medical Ctr., Inc., 722 F.2d 1535, 1542 (11th Cir. 1984),
enforcing 260 N.L.R.B. 862 (1982).
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and transferring employees. 9 The NLRB and the Eleventh Circuit
have recognized that determining whether nurses are supervisors
under the NLRA is difficult because nurses traditionally exercise in-
dependent judgment as professionals which can be viewed as similar
to judgment exercised by a supervisor.5 With these principles in
mind, the Eleventh Circuit in NLRB v. Walker County Medical
Center, Inc. found alleged supervisory nurses not to be supervisors be-
cause they engaged mainly in direct patient care. 1
2. Circuits Partially Accepting the NLRB's Patient Care
Analysis
The Fourth Circuit has recognized the NLRB's patient care anal-
ysis by agreeing that in some areas supervisory factors need to be ap-
plied flexibly because of the uniqueness of the employment.5 2 Thus,
this circuit has noted that in the nursing profession, a nurse normally
exercises independent judgment in giving direct patient care; there-
fore, the NLRB has held that the "independent judgment" part of sec-
tion 2(11) depends upon whether the conferment of judgment is
merely "an incident of professional service or is in addition to profes-
sional services. ' 53 However, this circuit emphasized that a high level
of skill and competence is not needed to find authority that is not
"clerical" or "routine. '54 This circuit also weighed heavily the fact the
NLRB has been inconsistent in applying the supervisory definition
and the factors used in determining such application. 5 Therefore, the





52. NLRB v. St. Mary's Home, Inc., 690 F.2d 1062, 1066 (4th Cir. 1982), denying enforce-
ment in relevant part of 258 N.L.R.B. 1024 (1981) (agreeing with the NLRB's patient care
analysis).
53. Id. at 1066-67 (noting also that the NLRB's holding has generally been accepted in the
courts and by Congress).
54. Id. at 1067.
55. Id. (noting inconsistencies in the supervisory application outside long term health care
as well). The Court noted one commentator has observed that "the Board has inconsistently
applied the definition 'of supervisor as to cause one necessarily to speculate' that the pattern of
Board decisions on supervisory status [is a] bias on the part of the Board's employees" as shown
by its practice of using the definition of supervisor that "most widens the coverage of the Act,
the definition that maximizes both the number of unfair labor practice findings it makes and the
number of unions it certifies." Id. (quoting Note, The NLRB and Supervisory Status: An Expla.
nation of Inconsistent Results, 94 HAgv. L. REv. 1712, 1714-14, 1721 (1981)).
56. St Mary's, 690 F.2d at 1067.
[Vol. 31:323
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Using this strict stance, the Fourth Circuit, in two separate cases,
has found nurses to be supervisors.57 In Riverchase Health Care
Center v. NLRB,58 the Fourth Circuit noted that on similar facts other
circuits have found nurses to be "employees."59 However, the court
still found the nurses to be supervisors, stating it was bound by its
prior decision in NLRB v. St. Mary's Home, Inc., where on similar
facts it found a nurse to be a supervisor because forty percent of the
time she had full responsibility of the nursing home's operation in
which care for patients was only one of her responsibilities.60
3. Circuits Rejecting the NLRB's Patient Care Analysis
The Sixth Circuit has vigorously dismissed the patient care analy-
sis and has instead based its findings of supervisory status on the plain
meaning of the statute.6' In NLRB v. Beacon Light Christian Nursing
Home,62 this circuit found that, as a matter of law, direction and as-
signment of aides by nurses using independent professional judgment
is in the interest of the employer.63 Additionally, the court stated that
"patient care.., is the business of a nursing home."6 The NLRB has
essayed on the disagreement between its view and the Sixth Circuit's
view of supervisory status.65 The NLRB sees the disagreement as fo-
cused on whether the direction and assignment of aides, in perform-
ance of patient care functions, creates statutory supervisory status.66
Despite the Sixth Circuit's view, the NLRB has continued to apply its
patient care analysis reasoning that it is true to the statute as shown by
its legislative history and as explained by case law.67 In Health Care,
the Supreme Court finally addressed this conflict between the circuits.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ruby Wells, an LPN, was employed by Health Care and Retire-
ment Corporation of America (HCR) in a nursing home in Urbana,
57. Id. at 1067-68; Riverchase Health Care Ctr. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 725 (4th Cir. 1992),
denying enforcement of 305 N.L.R.B. No. 141 (Dec. 26, 1991). But see Methodist Home v.
NLRB, 596 F.2d 1173 (4th Cir. 1979), enforcing in relevant part 234 N.L.R.B. 535 (1978).
58. Riverchase, 976 F.2d at 725.
59. Id.
60. Id.; see St. Mary's, 690 F.2d at 1067-68.
61. Northcrest Nursing Home, 313 N.LR.B. 491, 495 (1993).
62. 825 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1987).
63. See id. at 1079-80.
64. Id. at 1079.
65. Northcrest, 313 N.L.R.B. at 496.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 497.
1995]
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Ohio.68 She filed a charge with the NLRB asserting she and two other
employees had been discharged from HCR for participating in activi-
ties protected by the NLRA.69 Included in the charge was also an
allegation that she and two other employees had been warned by
HCR for participating in protected activities. 70  The NLRB then is-
sued a complaint alleging HCR had violated section 8(a)(1) 71 of the
NLRA by disciplining several LPNs, and firing three of them, "for
engaging in concerted protected conduct for the purpose of collective
bargaining and other mutual aid and protection. '72
A hearing was then held before an administrative law judge
(ALJ)73 where HCR asserted that because of their work activities,
the staff nurses were supervisors and thus not protected under the
NLRA.74 When the suit was brought, HCR employed one Director of
Nursing, nine to eleven staff nurses consisting of both LPNs and RNs,
and fifty to fifty-five nurses' aides.75 On the weekends and during the
week after five p.m., the staff nurses were the senior ranking employ-
ees.76  Staff nurse responsibilities included monitoring the nurses'
aides' work, disciplining and counseling the aides, ensuring there was
proper staffing, resolving grievances and problems of the aides, re-
porting to management, and evaluating the aides' performances.77
The ALT found that the nurses were not supervisors and were
thus "employees" entitled to protection under the NLRA.7 8 The ALT
stated the staff nurses' supervisory work focused on the well-being of
68. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am., 306 N.L.R.B. 63, 63 (1992), rev'd, 987 F.2d
1256 (6th Cir. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994).
69. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 1256, 1258 (6th Cir.
1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994). The National Labor Relations Board asserts its jurisdiction
over nursing homes that have at least $100,000 in gross annual revenue. Developing Labor Law,
supra note 18, at 1646.
70. Health Care, 987 F.2d at 1258.
71. This section provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., to inter-
fere with restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 157 of this
title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988). Section 157 states in pertinent part: "Employees shall have
the right of self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
72. Health Care, 987 F.2d at 1258; Health Care, 306 N.L.R.B. at 68.
73. Health Care, 987 F.2d at 1258. Under the Rules and Regulations of the NLRB, formal
hearings on unfair labor practice claims issued by the General Council are heard by ALIs ap-
pointed by the NLRB. Developing Labor Law, supra note 18, at 1776. These judges' duties are
much like those of trial court judges in hearing witnesses, deciding on admissibility of evidence,
and making initial decisions and findings of fact. ld.
74. Health Care, 987 F.2d at 1258.
75. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1781.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Health Care, 987 F.2d at 1258.
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the nursing home's patients rather than that of the employer; there-
fore, the nurses' supervisory tasks did not "equate to responsibly di-
recting the aides in the interest of the employer. ' 79  However, the
ALl reasoned HCR had not committed any unfair labor practices in
discharging the nurses or in disciplining them because HCR's actions
had been based on justified considerations.80
The General Council8'1 of the NLRB disputed the finding that no
unfair labor practices had been committed by HCR and filed excep-
tions to the decision.' HCR challenged the decision the nurses were
not supervisors as defined by the NLRA by filing cross-petitions. 83
The NLRB issued a Decision and Order upholding the ALJ's findings
that the nurses were not supervisors, but found the AUJ had incor-
rectly held HCR had not committed any unfair labor practices."4 In-
stead, the NLRB found HCR had violated section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA and ordered HCR to rehire the nurses with back pay and to
cease and desist from engaging in any further unfair labor practices.85
HCR petitioned for review of the NLRB's decision and the
NLRB filed a cross-petition for enforcement.86 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the ALJ's holding as to the non-supervi-
sory status of the nurses and therefore concluded a review of the mer-
its of the unfair labor practice claims was unnecessary because the
nurses were not covered by the NLRA.87 The court followed its pre-
vious decisions, such as Beverly California Corp. v. NLRB,ss and held
the NLRB's test for determining the supervisory status of nurses was
inconsistent with the statute.89 In Beverly, the court found "the notion
79. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1781 (quoting Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am., 306
N.L.R.B. 68, 70 (1992)).
80. Health Care, 987 F.2d at 1258.
81. The General Council of the NLRB has the final authority to investigate charges, issu-
ances of complaints, and the prosecution of complaints before the NLRB. Developing Labor
Law, supra note 18, at 1774.
82. Health Care, 987 F.2d at 1258. Any party who disputes the ALl's decision may file
exceptions to it along with a supporting brief. Developing Labor Law, supra note 18, at 1799.
83. Health Care, 987 F.2d at 1258.
84. Id
85. Id. NLRB orders are not self executing;, they only prescribe the steps necessary to re-
dress and remedy unlawful actions. Developing Labor Law, supra note 18, at 1877.
86. Health Care, 987 F.2d at 1258. The NLRB must apply to the appropriate U.S. Court of
Appeals to gain enforcement of its cease and desist orders when a party refuses to obey. Devel-
oping Labor Law, supra note 18, at 1877. Likewise, when a final order is issued against a re-
spondent, they are entitled to petition for immediate review in the Court of Appeals. Id. at 1881.
A respondent cannot be penalized for disobeying the order until after there is enforcement by
the appellate court. Id. at 1877.
87. Health Care, 987 F.2d at 1261.
88. 970 F.2d 1548 (6th Cir. 1992).
89. Health Care, 987 F.2d at 1261.
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that direction given to subordinate personnel to ensure that the em-
ployer's nursing home customers receive 'quality care' somehow fails
to qualify as direction given 'in the interest of the employer' makes
very little sense to us." 90 The court then went on to apply the lan-
guage of the Beverly test that "an employee is considered a supervisor
if any one of the enumerated job tasks are undertaken, provided the
authority is exercised in the interest of the employer and requires the
use of independent judgment," to the job duties of the Heartland
LPNs.91 Based on the LPNs' job duties, the court found the nurses to
be supervisors.9
V. TIE ISSUE AND DECISION OF HEALTH CARE
A. The Issue
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari93 in order to
resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals over the validity of
the NLRB's test.94 The Court framed the issue as whether the
NLRB's test for deciding if nurses are supervisors "is consistent with
the statutory definition."95 To determine whether an employee is a
supervisor under section 2(11) of the NLRA, three questions must be
answered in the affirmative. 96 First, does the employee have the au-
thority to perform one out of the twelve listed activities in section
2(11)? 97 Second, is the exercise of that authority not of a "routine or
clerical nature," but requires "the use of independent judgment?"9
Third, does the employee exercising this authority do so "in the inter-
est of the employer?" 99 The Supreme Court narrowed its inquiry to
the third question based on its decision that the NLRB's test relied on
an industry wide interpretation of "in the interest of the employer." 1°0
As a result, the Court's decision turned on what it felt to be the proper
interpretation of this statutory phrase. 01
90. Beverly, 970 F.2d at 1552.
91. Health Care, 987 F.2d at 1261.
92. Id.
93. NLRB v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 56 (1993). Judgments
under the NLRA made by the Courts of Appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as
provided by § 10(e,f). Developing Labor Law, supra note 18, at 1878.
94. NLRB v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778, 1781 (1994).





100. Id. at 1780, 1785.
101. Id. at 1780.
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B. The Decision
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, held invalid the
NLRB's test for determining the supervisory status of nurses, 0 2 under
which "a nurse's direction of less skilled employees, in the exercise of
professional judgment incidental to the treatment of patients, is not
authority exercised 'in the interest of the employer."" 3 Relying on
Fall River and Dying Corp. v. NLRB,' °4 the Court stated it reviewed
the NLRB's test to see if it was "rational and consistent with the Act"
and agreed with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that it was not. 0 5
1. Statutory Language and Supreme Court Precedents
The Court began by looking at the approach of the NLRB's test
and compared it with the NLRB's approach in NLRB v. Yeshiva Uni-
versity.'0 6 The Court determined, as in Yeshiva, that the NLRB's test
created a false dichotomy. 0 7 The Court found the dichotomy be-
tween acts done in conjunction with patient care and acts done in the
interest of the employer to make no sense.'08 According to the Court,
the NLRB's position that supervisory authority exerted in conjunction
with patient care is not in the interest of the employer was incorrect
because the business of a nursing home is patient care. °9 Following
this reasoning then, attending to nursing home patients is always in
the interest of the employer." 0 Especially important to the Court in
supporting this conclusion was its prior holding in Packard Motor Car
Co. v. NLRB, where it had found the ordinary meaning of "in the
interest of the employer" to be any acts authorized by the employer or
any acts within the scope of employment."'
The Court next rejected the NLRB's argument it should be given
ample room to apply certain statutory phrases such as "independent
judgment" and "responsibility to direct" because they are ambigu-
ous." 2 Even though the Court agreed these phrases are ambiguous, it
refused to look at this argument stating that those phrases were not
102. Id. at 1779-80.
103. Id.
104. 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
105. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1781.
106. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).




111. Id (citing Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 488-89 (1947)).
112. Id. at 1783.
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used as the basis of the NLRB's test. 13 Furthermore, the Court held
that the NLRB's argument made parts of the definition in section
2(11) meaningless.11 4 The Court viewed the NLRB's rule as stating
that "[o]nly a nurse who in the course of employment uses independ-
ent judgment to engage in one of the activities related to another em-
ployee's job status or pay ... [is] a supervisor."'1 5 As a result, the
Court concluded that the NLRB had "read[ ] the responsible direction
portion of § 2(11) out of the statute in nurse cases."' n 6
2. Non-Statutory Arguments
Once again in reaching its decision, the Court focused on its prior
case law. Relying on Yeshiva, it rejected the NLRB's position that
conflicting loyalties, which the exclusion of supervisors was designed
to avoid, would not be presented by giving organizational rights to
nurses when their supervisory authority focuses on patient care. 117
The Court concluded that this argument was rejected in Yeshiva when
the NLRB stated there was no need for the managerial exclusion be-
cause there was no danger of divided loyalties." 8 As in Yeshiva, the
Court rejected any policy argument on the basis of divided loyalty." 9
It assumed that the statute does not permit consideration of the po-
tential for divided loyalties, and disagreed with the NLRB that there
was no danger of divided loyalty in the instant case. 2 ° With this as-
sumption in mind, the Court refused to consider the divided loyalties
issue.' 2
1
The Court next rejected the NLRB's argument that the phrase
"in the interest of the employer" should be given a limited reading so
that the phrase would not override Congress' intent to provide protec-
tion to professional employees under the NLRA.' 22 It again looked at
Yeshiva and found the NLRB's argument analogous to the one re-
jected in that case.'2 3 Lastly, the Court refused to defer to the






118. Id. (citing Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 684).
119. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1784.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 152 (11) (1988) (defining "supervisor"); see 29 U.S.C. § 152 (12)
(1988) (defining "professional employee").
123. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1784.
[Vol. 31:323
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other sections of the NLRA unauthoritative on the issue.124 In con-
clusion, the Court held the patient care analysis test "inconsistent with
the statute and [this Court's] precedents.""2
VI. ANALYSIS OF HEALTH CARE
A. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB and Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v.
Primary Steel, Inc.
In rendering its decision in Health Care, the Court relied on its
own previous interpretation of "in the interest of the employer."
Without stating as much, the Court seems to be relying on its 1990
decision in Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc.126 and its
1992 decision in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB. 127 Both of these cases gen-
erally hold that the Supreme Court will defer to its own previous in-
terpretations of administrative statutes rather than defer to
administrative agencies' interpretations of statutes.2s The Lechmere
decision is a continuation of the standard set out in Maislin where the
Court held that "[o]nce we have determined a statute's clear meaning,
we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis,
and we judge an agency's later interpretation of the statute against our
prior determination of the statute's meaning.' '1 2 Thus, stare decisis
may prevail over judicial deference to administrative agencies if the
Supreme Court has previously determined the clear meaning of a
statute. o
Applying this interpretation of Maislin and Lechmere to the pres-
ent case, the majority was correct to look at its prior holdings in
Yeshiva and Packard to interpret the phrase "in the interest of the
employer." The Court determined it had found the clear meaning of
this phrase in Packard and Yeshiva. 3 ' Therefore, because the Court
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1785.
126. 497 U.S. 116 (1990).
127. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
128. Maislin, 497 U.S. at 131; Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 536-37.
129. Maislin, 497 U.S. at 131.
130. Several commentators have written about the effect of Lechmere and Maislin on the
"traditional" two-step approach for deciding when to accept an agency's interpretation of a stat-
ute under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). See Rebecca Hanner White, The Stare Decisis "Exception" To The Chevron Deference
Rul 44 FLA. L. REV. 723 (1992); Jahan Sharifi, Comment, Precedents Construing Statutes Ad-
ministered By Federal Agencies After The Chevron Decision: What Gives?, 60 U. Cm. L. Rnv.
223 (1993); Susan K. Goplen, Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies' Legal Interpreta-
tions After Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 68 WAsH. L. Rlv. 207 (1993).
131. See Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1782-83.
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limited its review to this phrase, the Lechmere and Maislin holdings
show that the Court's prior case law construing this part of section
2(11) outweighs the NLRB's interpretation. 32
B. The Patient Care Analysis is Rational and Consistent with the
NLRA
As stated previously, the majority took a very narrow view of the
issue in Health Care and looked only to the phrase "in the interest of
the employer." The majority began its review by stating it would de-
termine if the NLRB's test was "rational and consistent with the Act;"
however, it never went back to this standard. 33 The Court seems to
have viewed the issue as a pure question of law because it refused to
look at the policy behind the NLRB's test and the NLRA. 3 a In con-
trast, the dissent framed the issue more broadly in resolving this recur-
ring question. The dissent framed the issue as whether the NLRB's
test, as an attempt to carry out the task Congress gave it to separate
the definition of "supervisors" excluded from the NLRA from "pro-
fessionals" sheltered by the NLRA, is rational and consistent with the
NLRA.135
The dissent was correct to consider the tension between the defi-
nitions of "supervisor" and "professionals" as framed by its statement
of the issue.136 The Court in other instances has looked at the applica-
tion of a rule of the NLRB and what the consequences would be if
132. However, it can also be said that the Court did its own analysis under Chevron. Under
Chevron's two step approach a court must first determine whether there is a clear congressional
intent governing the interpretation of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If Congress has
spoken on the issue, the court must give effect to Congress' intent. Id. at 842-43. Next, the court
must defer to the agency's interpretation if Congress has not "directly addressed the precise
question at issue." Id. at 843-44. Thus, when the Court in Health Care stated that "[t]here is no
indication that Congress intended any different meaning when it included the phrase in the stat-
utory definition of supervisor later in 1947," Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1782, it was stating that
the intent of Congress was clear and that it must give effect to this intent.
133. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1781. The rational basis test originated in Gray v. Powell, 314
U.S. 402, 413 (1941), under which courts will uphold an agency's statutory findings if they are
rpasonable..
134. The Court in Packard declined to look at policy considerations when deciding the "na-
ked question of law" whether the NLRB's interpretation of "in the interest of the employer" was
within the terms of the NLRA. Packard, 330 U.S. at 493. Indeed, in one post-Health Care case,
the court cited Health Care for the proposition that "legislative history and policy arguments
may not be employed where their use would distort the plain meaning of the statute." Stark v.
Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 555, 560 (D. Mass. 1995).
135. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
136. See, e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978) where the Supreme
Court emphasized that the NLRB has the primary responsibility for applying and developing
national labor policy. Additionally, the Court stated:
16
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that rule was not upheld, such as in NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scien-
tific, Inc. 137  In Curtin Matheson, the NLRB used a test in which "it
would not apply any presumption regarding striker replacements'
union sentiments," but instead used a case-by-case determination in
deciding whether striker replacements oppose a union.138 The Court
looked at the policy of why the no-presumption rule was correct. 139 It
found an "antiunion presumption might chill employees' exercise of
their statutory right to engage in 'concerted activities." ' 140 The over-
whelming factor for the Court in upholding the NLRB's rule in Curtin
Matheson was therefore that employees might lose this right if the
NLRB had held to the contrary. 41 For this reason, the Court con-
cluded that the NLRB can "adopt rules restricting conduct that
threatens to destroy... collective-bargaining... or that may impair
the employee's right to engage in concerted activity."' 42
The dissent looked at the consequences which could arise if the
NLRB's test, which construes the category of supervisors narrowly,
was not upheld. The dissent recognized that the reading given to the
definition of "supervisor" decides the extent to which "professionals"
are covered by the NLRA.143 Thus, the dissent felt the definition of
Because it is to the Board that Congress entrusted the task of "applying the Act's gen-
eral prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of events which might
be charged as violative of its terms," that body, if it is to accomplish the task which
Congress set for it, necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the intersti-
ces of the broad statutory provisions.
Id. (quoting Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945)).
137. 494 U.S. 775 (1990).
138. Id. at 781-82.
139. Id. at 794.
140. Id. at 795.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 796. Several other Supreme Court cases have also found this policy argument to
be determinative in upholding a rule of the NLRB. See Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv. v.
NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 412, 418-19 (1982) (upholding a rule of the NLRB disallowing an em-
ployer's unilateral withdrawal from a multiemployer bargaining unit during an impasse because
the rule advanced the ultimate goal of stability in the bargaining process); NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1967) (upholding a rule of the NLRB that prohibited em-
ployer's payment of vacation benefits to crossovers, replacements, and nonstrikers but not to
strikers because of the "potential for adverse effect upon employee rights," namely concerted
activity); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 230-31 (1963) (upholding a decision of the
NLRB that prohibited employers from giving super-seniority to strike replacements and strike
crossovers because super-seniority would damage future bargaining relationships and concerted
activity).
143. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). A professional employee is
defined as:
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in
character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) in-
volving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of
such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be stan-
dardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced
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supervisor had to be read narrowly, as the NLRB had, so that it would
not exclude all employees that have authority to use "independent
judgment to assign and responsibly direct the work of other employ-
ees," because most professionals have some authority in this respect
and they would be stripped of their coverage of the NLRA in contra-
diction to Congress' intent."4 Therefore, the dissent was correct to
look at this tension and hold the NLRB's patient care analysis "ra-
tional and consistent with the Act"'14 5 because the NLRB's rule pro-
tects professionals' statutory right to engage in concerted activity.
C. Divided Loyalty
The Court should not have assumed that the NLRA does not al-
low an interpretation that permits consideration of the potential for
divided loyalties.'46 The Court stated that to do so would allow a
unique interpretation in the health care field.' 47 However, as the dis-
sent correctly pointed out, the Court in Yeshiva found faculty mem-
bers to be managers and thus, excluded from the NLRA specifically
based on their alignment with management which would present
problems of divided loyalty if the faculty were allowed to unionize.' 48
The faculty members in Yeshiva had authority to decide the courses to
be offered, when they would be taught, and to whom they would be
taught.' 49 They decided who would be admitted to the University and
who would graduate.'5 0 The faculty had authority to decide what
type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of
specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a
hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship
or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes;
or
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual
instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing
related work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to be-
come a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).
29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1988).
144. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). "[T]he Board has a duty.., to
be alert not to construe supervisory status too broadly because the employee who is deemed a
supervisor is denied employee rights which the [A]ct is intended to protect." Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir. 1970); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
NLRB, 655 F.2d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 1981).
145. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1786 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
146. See id. at 1784.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 682, 686.
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grading system would be used as well as teaching methods.151 Accord-
ingly, the Court found the faculty was essential in creating and imple-
menting their employer's managerial interest. 52
Furthermore, the Court in Yeshiva stated that "even if union
membership arguably may involve some divided loyalty," employees
whose authority is limited to the discharge of professional duties in
tasks they have been assigned should not be excluded from cover-
age. 53 The Court made this statement to curb the fear that the mana-
gerial exclusion could sweep all professionals outside the NLRA in
direct conflict with Congress' intent to include them.' 54 The Court in
Yeshiva specifically endorsed the NLRB's test and reasoning based on
the divided loyalties issue. The Court should not have been so quick
to dismiss this issue when it has been the basis for its own argument to
exclude managers and include professional employees under the
NLRA.
D. Legislative History to the 1974 Amendment Including Nonprofit
Hospitals Under the NLRA
The Court should have looked at the legislative history from the
1974 amendments to the Labor Management Relations Act which in-
cluded non-profit hospitals under the NLRA. 55 In response to health
care organizations urging an amendment to section 2(11) of the
NLRA to exclude health care professionals from the definition of su-
pervisor, the committee found an amendment unnecessary. It was un-
necessary, the committee found, because the "Board has carefully
avoided applying the definition of 'supervisor' to a health care profes-
sional who gives direction to other employees in the exercise of pro-
fessional judgment, which direction is incidental [to] the professional's
treatment of patients, and thus is not the exercise of supervisory au-
thority in the interest of the employer.' 56 The Court in Health Care
151. Id.
152. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at
686). See also Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 686 (finding the "faculty determine[d] ... the product to be
produced, the terms upon which it will be offered, and the customers who will be served.").
153. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 690.
154. Id.
155. This amendment gave NLRA protection to employees of non-profit hospitals to the
same extent that employees of nursing homes and proprietary hospitals had enjoyed by remov-
ing the exemption on section 2(2) of the NLRA. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 6 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3946, 3948 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 766].
156. Id. at 3951.
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stated that the 1974 amendment did not change the test for supervi-
sory status in the health care field and therefore gave it no considera-
tion.'57 This is no doubt true; however, the Court failed to recognize
it has held the construction of a statute by an administrative agency
should especially be followed "where Congress has refused to alter
the administrative construction."' 158 Indeed, in NLRB v. Bell Aero-
space Co.,'59 where the Supreme Court interpreted the term "manage-
rial," it stated:
In examining these authorities, we draw on several established prin-
ciples of statutory construction. In addition to the importance of
legislative history, a court may accord great weight to the longstand-
ing interpretation placed on a statute by an agency charged with its
administration. This is especially so where Congress has re-enacted
the statute without pertinent change. In these circumstances, con-
gressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is
persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by
Congress.' 60
The Court cited American Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB 161 to point out
it had rejected the petitioner's contention in that case that this 1974
Senate Report addressed the intentions of Congress as to a provision
within the 1935 version of the NLRA.' 62 In American, the Supreme
Court dismissed this argument because they found the committee re-
port did not have "the force of law" as applied to the case.'63 How-
ever, the situation in American is not analogous to Health Care. The
petitioner in American was trying to use legislative history to show
that Congress changed an existing administrative interpretation,
whereas the petitioner in Health Care was using legislative history to
show that Congress endorsed the NLRB's existing practices.
Moreover, the Court in Yeshiva endorsed the NLRB's test by cit-
ing to this committee report. The Court in Yeshiva stated that "[i]n
the health-care context, the Board asks in each case whether the deci-
sions alleged to be... supervisory are 'incidental to' or 'in addition to'
the treatment of patients, a test Congress expressly approved in
157. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1784.
158. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 177 (1981)
(quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)). See also NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1965).
159. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
160. Id. at 274-75.
161. 499 U.S. 606 (1991).
162. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1784.
163. Id. (citing American, 499 U.S. at 616).
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1974."' 164 Therefore, it is clear this Congressional endorsement should
have carried greater weight. 165
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The Supreme Court's decision in Health Care only determined
that the NLRB's patient care analysis was incorrect. It did not change
the overall law regarding section 2(11). As the Court stated: "[O]ur
decision casts no doubt on Board or court decisions interpreting parts
of § 2(11) other than the specific phrase 'in the interest of the em-
ployer."1 66 Thus, the Court merely told the NLRB that it could not
rely on an industry-wide interpretation of "in the interest of the em-
ployer" but must apply the same rationale to nurses that it does to
similar employees when determining their supervisory status.
The NLRB now has the task of determining how to apply the
other parts of section 2(11) to the function and responsibilities of
nurses. To provide a structure for analyzing these parts of the statute
in nurse cases, the NLRB scheduled oral argument for October 28,
1994 in two cases, Providence Hospital & Alaska Nurses Ass'n 167 and
Ten Broeck Common Nursing Home & United Industrial Workers Lo-
cal 424,168 in which the supervisory status of nurses is in issue.169 The
NLRB asked interested parties to address (1) the impact of Health
Care on the supervisory status of nurses, (2) "how the [Board] should
interpret the relevant provisions of Section 2(11) ... especially the
terms 'assign,' 'responsibility to direct,' 'routine,' and 'independent
164. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 690 n.30 (citing S. REP. No. 766, supra note 155). The circuit courts
have also acknowledged the Supreme Court's approval of the NLRB's test in Yeshiva. See Mise-
ricordia Hosp. Medical Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 818 (2d Cir. 1980).
165. The circuit courts have viewed these amendments as authoritative and looked to them
when dealing with bargaining unit determinations under § 9(b), even though this section was not
amended in 1974. See NLRB v. Res-Care, 705 F.2d 1461, 1470 (7th Cir. 1983). The Seventh
Circuit has stated:
Congress did change the law in 1974 - it put nonprofit health care institutions under the
National Labor Relations Act ... and maybe the committee's statements should be
viewed as a source of guidance to the courts in interpreting the impact of the amend-
ment on the whole Act; by changing the coverage of [the] statute, you can also change
its meaning. In any event, the circuits including ours have treated the statements as
authoritative.
Id. See, e.g, NLRB v. HMO Int'l/Calif. Medical Group Health Plan, Inc., 678 F.2d 806 (9th Cir.
1982); Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Mercy
Hosp. Ass'n, 606 F.2d 22 (2nd Cir. 1979); NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213 (7th Cir.
1978).
166. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1785.
167. Providence Hosp. & Alaska Nurses Ass'n (NLRB 1994) (No. 19-RC-12866).
168. Ten Broeck Common Nursing Home & United Indus. Workers Local 424 (NLRB 1994)
(No. 3-RC-10166).
169. 147 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 129 (Oct. 3, 1994).
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judgment"', and (3) how the provisions of section 2(11) should be har-
monized with section 2(12).7 ° Thus, until these two cases are re-
solved by the NLRB, the full impact of Health Care will not be known.
A. Impact Outside the Health Care Field
The Court stated in Health Care that its decision would have al-
most no effect outside of nurse cases because the NLRB's patient care
analysis was for the most part confined to those cases;' 7' however, it is
too soon to tell what its impact will be outside the health care field. In
post-Health Care cases regarding the supervisory status of profession-
als, the NLRB has taken advantage of dicta from Health Care to limit
its application.'72 For example, in Greenspan73 the NLRB began its
analysis by acknowledging that the Court in Health Care "did not
change the overall law regarding 2(11) supervisors;" therefore, it
would determine the supervisory status of professionals based on the
"traditional" criteria of section 2(11).174 The NLRB cited the Court's
endorsement of
results reflecting a distinction between authority arising from pro-
fessional knowledge and the authority encompassing front-line
management prerogatives if it does not result from manipulation of
the statutory phrase "in the interest of the employer," but instead
from a finding that the employee in question had not met the other
requirements of supervisory status under the Act, such as the re-
quirement that the employee exercise one of the listed activities in a
non-routine manner.
175
With these principles in mind, the NLRB looked to its prior deci-
sions regarding professionals and determined the professionals were
170. Id.
171. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1785.
172. Cf. Patty Reinert, NLRB Rejects Legal Aid Officials' Bid to Void Union Election Re-
sults, DAILY REcoRD (Baltimore), July 25, 1994, at 3 (Legal aid office tried to void union elec-
tion results stating lawyers and legal aides were supervisors in light of Health Care. However,
the Regional Director of the NLRB stated the "courts ruling was limited to the question of the
supervisory status of nurses. In fact.... the court made a point of saying its decision would have
'almost no effect' in other cases.").
173. Greenspan, 318 N.L.R.B. No. 5, 1995 WL 455372 (July 31, 1995). Respondent, Robert
Greenspan D.D.S., withdrew recognition of a union representing dentists contending that the
dentists were supervisors based on Health Care. Id. at *2. He contended that the dentists
responsibly directed dental assistants and had the authority to "effectively recommend the hire,
transfer, suspension, assignment, or discipline of the dental assistants." Id. at *11.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *14 (quoting Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1785).
[Vol. 31:323
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not supervisors. It cited one of its previous findings that "an em-
ployee with special expertise or training who directs or instructs an-
other in the proper performance of his work for which the former is
professionally responsible is not thereby rendered a supervisor."'1 7 6
Thus, the NLRB found the professionals' authority to direct others
was routine and that their authority to recommend transfer was exer-
cised too infrequently. 177 The NLRB concluded with: "Most profes-
sional employees employed in a commercial setting have some
authority over their subordinates pursuant to their training and posi-
tions. A finding that the [professionals] herein are supervisors within
the meaning of the Act would severely limit the applicability of Sec-
tion 2(12) of the Act."'178
B. Impact on the Health Care Industry
The primary concern of health care unions will be that the
Supreme Court's decision in Health Care will increase litigation be-
cause employers can use it to divest nurses of their NLRA rights. Sev-
eral health care institutions charged with a violation of sections
8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA for refusing to bargain with unions after
certification have attacked the validity of bargaining unit certifications
by claiming that the unit is inappropriate because some of the unit
employees are now supervisors under Health Care.17 9 In addition,
several health care institutions, which had previously stipulated that
certain nurses were employees and not supervisors, withdrew this stip-
ulation in light of Health Care.8 0
The primary concern of those in the health care industry who op-
pose the decision in Health Care is its impact on quality patient
176. Id. (citing Golden West Broadcasters, 215 N.L.R.B. 760 n.4 (1974)).
177. Id. at *12-13.
178. Id. at *14.
179. Hirsch v. Konig, No. 95-CV-2832JBS, 1995 WL 471897 (D.N.J. 1995) (alleging three
LPNs were supervisors and could not be in the unit and that it had no obligation to bargain in
light of Health Care); Desert Hospital, 316 N.L.R.B. No. 190 (April 17,1995) (claiming alleged
supervisory participation in the unit); Heartshare Human Services, 317 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (May 25,
1995) (claiming that certain instructors who voted in the election are supervisors under Health
Care).
180. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 627,315 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1994) (demanding record
be reopened to present evidence of supervisory status in light of Health Care); Michael Konig,
318 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 1995 WL 490326 (August 15, 1995) (arguing that LPN was a supervisor,
therefore, nursing center was not liable for discharging the LPN); Opportunity Homes, Inc., 315
N.L.R.B. 1210 (1994) (arguing Health Care articulated a new standard for supervisory status in
the health care field).
1995]
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care.181 As they view the decision, it in effect means nurses who have
authority to direct other employees could be fired for questioning
management decisions or job conditions which put quality patient care
at risk.1 Others, however, do not see the decision as being detrimen-
tal to nurses or quality patient care. 83 As one attorney has pointed
out, nurses still have significant protection under the public policy ex-
ceptions to the employment at will doctrine at the state level. 84
Therefore, they will still have protection individually, but it will come
from a different source.18 5
As for nurses themselves, many may lose their NLRA rights.
Nurses have ethical and legal obligations under their state nursing
practice acts to be an advocate for their patients. 86 By their profes-
sional licensure and ethical standards, nurses are required to make
independent judgments'87 and use discretion which may divest them
of their NLRA rights without the patient care analysis to protect
them. However, the impact of Health Care on nurses awaits the
NLRB's decisions in Providence and Ten Broeck.
C. Resolution to the Conflict in the Circuit Courts of Appeals?
As stated previously, the Supreme Court's decision in Health
Care focused only on the phrase 'in the interest of the employer.'
Thus, the Court was not presented with the task of analyzing the facts
in the record to determine if the NLRB's application of the other
parts of section 2(11) were correct.188 The NLRB's patient care anal-
ysis alone was not the reason for conflict in the circuit courts. There
was not just a conflict over the validity of the patient care analysis, but
also what criteria to focus on in applying other parts of section 2(11)
to nurses.189
181. Stuart Silverstein, Washington State Nurses Association Disturbed By Supreme Court
Decision On Nurses As Supervisors, PR NEwswIRE, May 27, 1994, available in Global-Search,
Access No. 199405270045PR.
182. Id. Indeed, this was exactly the case in Health Care. The LPNs who were discharged
were let go several months after they had gone to HCR management to discuss problems such as
short staffing, disparate enforcement of HCR's absentee policy, and HCR's switch from one
pharmacy to another whose service was not adequate. Health Care, 306 N.L.R.B. at 63.
183. See Laura Bruck, Can Nurses Be Fired For Complaining? Conflicting Views on a Recent
Supreme Court Decision, NURSING HOMES, July-August 1994, at 38.
184. Id
185. Id
186. Are You a Supervisor?, TiH OKLAHOMA NURsE, Oct.-Dec. 1994, at 12-13.
187. Supreme Court Decision Challenges RN Patient Advocacy Role, CALIFORNIA NURSE,
June 1994, at 1.
188. See Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1785.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 21-67.
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Each circuit reviewing the supervisory status of nurses has fo-
cused on and given different weight to criteria found to constitute su-
pervisory status. The NLRB and the circuit courts are still left with a
free rein to apply whatever criteria they feel answer the question
before them. 90 The determination of supervisory status is highly fact
based and usually depends on the activities of the nurses and the
structure of the nursing home or hospital. 91 Accordingly, some flexi-
bility must be given.' 92
As a suggestion, the Seventh Circuit's review of the policies be-
hind the exclusion of supervisors is a good starting point.193 The two
criteria on which the Seventh Circuit focuses, the ratio of non-supervi-
sory employees to supervisory employees and disciplinary authority,
have been widely used by other circuits. 194 Additionally, by starting at
the "grass roots," the decision over supervisory status can properly
focus on the intent of Congress in excluding supervisors. Justice Gins-
burg's dissent in Health Care would agree with this conclusion. 95 The
dissent looked to the intent of Congress in adopting the supervisory
exclusion which was to exclude from protection those persons "vested
with... genuine management prerogatives.' 96  By focusing on the
190. The NLRB is of the view that only Supreme Court decisions bind it in future cases.
Rebecca Harmer White, Time For a New Approaci Why The Judiciary Should Disregard The
"Law Of The Circuit" When Confronting Nonacquiescience By The National Labor Relations
Board, 69 N.C. L. REv. 639, 644 (1991). The NLRB regards circuit court decisions only as "the
law of the case" and has instructed its AL~s to follow the law as laid down by the Board. Id. at
642, 644. The circuit courts of course are not bound by precedents from other circuits and may
review Board decisions applying the law of their circuit.
191. See Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Ctr. v. NLRB, 933 F.2d 626, 629 (8th Cir. 1991);
Misericordia Hosp. Medical Ctr. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 808, 818 (2d Cir. 1980).
192. See Waverly, 933 F.2d at 629; NLRB v. St. Mary's Home, Inc., 690 F.2d 1062, 1066 (4th
Cir. 1982).
193. See Children's Habilitation Ctr. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 130, 131-32 (7th Cir. 1989).
194. See Beverly Calif. Corp. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 1548 (6th Cir. 1992) (utilizing disciplinary
and ratio criteria in the Sixth Circuit); Riverchase Health Care Ctr. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 725 (4th
Cir. 1992) (utilizing the disciplinary criterion in the Fourth Circuit); NLRB v. Res-Care, 705 F.2d
1461 (7th Cir. 1983) (utilizing the disciplinary and ratio criteria in the Seventh Circuit); NLRB v.
Walker County Medical Ctr., Inc., 722 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1984) (utilizing the disciplinary crite-
rion in the Eleventh Circuit); Waverly, 933 F.2d at 626 (utilizing the disciplinary and ratio criteria
in the Eighth Circuit); St Mary's, 690 F.2d 1062 (utilizing the ratio criterion in the Fourth Cir-
cuit). Jerry Hunter, General Counsel for the NLRB, has said that he "believes the [B]oard will
continue to look at 'ratios' in determining supervisory status. For instance ... in a unit of five
nurses where there are three that direct the work, it is unlikely those three would be found to be
supervisors." Justices Find Nurses Who Direct Other Employees Are Supervisors, DALY LAB.
REP., May 24, 1994, at 4.
195. Health Care, 114 S. Ct. at 1785 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
196. S. REP. No. 105, supra note 31. See also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510,80th Cong., 1st Sess.
35 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1130, 1135, and in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATrVE HISTORY OF
THE LABoR MANAEMErNT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 539 (1948).
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balance of power and conflict of interest concerns, only those employ-
ees who have "genuine management prerogatives" will be found to be
supervisors and excluded from coverage of the NLRA based on the
intent of Congress.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Health Care has a positive im-
pact on the NLRA as a whole but a negative impact on nurses. By
rejecting a special industry wide test, the Court created greater uni-
formity within the NLRA and clarified the test for the supervisory
status of nurses. However, the majority failed to take into account the
work nurses do, and as a result, many nurses may lose their NLRA
rights. As for professionals outside the health care field, the impact of
Health Care may have been minimized or neutralized by both the
Court's narrowing of the issue to an interpretation of "in the interest
of the employer" and its explicit dicta. The NLRB and the courts now
have the task of defining and applying all sections of 2(11) in deter-
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